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lN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
TH_E,.:~-ATE INSURANCE ~~i~~ff. )
,liE INDUSTRIAL CO~f1IISSION
OF UT1\H, ALFRED LUND and

Case
No.10095

lTNITED PARI{ CITY l\IINES

Defendants.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT
UNITED PARK CIT'Y MINES CO.
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a claim under the Utah Occupational Disease
Law (herein called the "0. D. Law") for permanent disability benefits by reason for silicotuberculosis. Defendant United Park City Mines Company (herein called ''defendant employer") and plaintiff are in dispute as to
which of them has obligation to pay whatever benefits
defendant Alfred Lund {herein called ''defendant
Lund'') is entitled to receive. Defendant employer joins
plaintiff, however, in plaintiff's assertion that defendant
1
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Lund's exposure does not satisfy the requirements of the
0. D. Law and that, on any findings of facts the evidence
will support, benefits may not properly be a\\ arded in
this case.
7

STATEj\IENT OF FACTS
Defendant employer adopts and concurs in plaintiff's
statement of facts, with the following addition:
1. During the period from December 1, 1961, through
December 30, 1961,. defendant Lund was employed
under conditions which entailed as much exposure
to silicon dioxide dust as did the conditions of his
employment with defendant employer during any
previous period after he began working above
ground in 1931. In his employment during December of 1961, defendant Lund was engaged in
cleaning dried mine muck (having the silicon
content characteristic of the mine) off tools, and
his use of a respirator in that work was necessary
(R. 38). In his previous jobs after 1931, he
worked above ground ( R. 33), and there is no
evidence that his exposure was anything but the
common experience of all residents of the Park
City community.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
IF THE DISABILITY IN THE INSTANT
CASE IS COMPENSABLE, PLAINTIFF, AS
THE COl\!PENSATION INSURANCE CAR2
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I~I~~R 1\rr TIIE
rri~~R \IIX .\ TIVE,
I) ..c\ }T \I :B~NT.

TI:\IES "THICH ..\RE DEIS RESPONSIBLE FOR

Plaintiff primarily argues the evidence does not support thP Commission's finding that defendant Lund was
exposed to harmful quantities of silicon dioxide dust for
five of the fifteen years preceding his disablement. As
've have indicated, we fully concur in plaintiff's argument
in this regard.
If the exposure has been sufficient, however, plaintiff still asserts its freedom from responsibility, and it
does so on two theories. It will be defendant employer's
purpose in this brief to explore those two theories and
demonstrate their invalidity.

A
Plaintiff's Arg?tment That, If There Was Five
r· ears Exposure in the Last Fifteen., None of It
Was After December 1, 1961.

Plaintiff was the carrier for defendant employer for
30 da~·~ before defendant Lund's employment with
defendant employer terminated. Plaintiff asserts (and
we concur) that it cannot be liable unless there was some
harmful exposure during that 30 days. We might well
agree that the December employment did not entail harmful exposure, but we must certainly contradict plaintiff's
averment that the evidence less strongly supports a finding of harmful December exposure than it supports that
finding with reference to any previous employment period after 1931. The strongest evidence of harmful exposure defendant Lund presented at the hearing had
3
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relation only to his work in the carpenter shop at Keetley.
During that employment, he was cleaning dried muck off
tools with an emery wheel - an activity which created
so much dust that a. respirator was acknowledged to be
necessary. Besides that, defendant Lund continued to be
exposed to whatever general dust conditions prevailed in
a mining community.
Before he moved to Keetley, defendant Lund's exposure was not direct and was aggravated, if at all, only
when the wind off the mine dump caused general atmospheric pollution. We do not believe the 0. D. Law contemplates that an employer should be responsible for
disease processes attributable to the kind of exposure
which all residents in an area where the soil has silica
content must endure. This was the nature of defendant
Lund's exposure until May 1, 1957 (see plaintiff's brief,
page 3) when he was transferred to Keetley.
If there was any harmful exposure after defendant
Lund came out of the mine in 1931, it was certainly the
exposure entailed in the tool cleaning and associated activity at Keetley. The Commission specifically found the
exposure in December to have been harmful (R. 86)
and, if the record supports any Commission finding, it
supports that one.
B
Plaintiff's .Argument That the .Jet Requires 30
Sepa.rate Days of Harnlful Exposure iu the Employ1nent of au En1ployer Before That Enzployer
Can Haz'e Responsibility.
4
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Before undertaking to criticise this argument, we
should makP it clear that \VC deny that plaintiff could es<·ape responsibility in this case even if it were conclusively demonstrated that plaintiff was not the compensation car1ier ''during a period of thirty days'' when the
applicant \vas harmfully exposed. An entire section of
this brief will be devoted to this point. Nevertheless, we
feel the position should be asserted that (even if the requirenH_1nts of Section 35-2-14 had to be satisfied 'vith
reference to insurance carriers as well as employers) the
t xposure in the instant case, if it was harmful at all, "\vas
sufficient during December of 1961 so that plaintiff is
responsible.
1

Section 35-2-14 initially provided that the only employer liable would be the one in whose employment the
employee had last been harmfully exposed ''during a
period of s ix·t y days or more.'' From a medical point of
Yiew, even a sixty-day continuous exposure would be a
ridiculous basis on which to predicate responsibility for
the disease. Our legislature (Section 35-2-13, U.C.A.
1953) clearly recognized, in conformity with accepted
medical doctrine, that five years' exposure is the least
whirh will produce the disease. The sixty (now thirty)
day period of employment which imposes the compensation obligation on an employer was never intended as a
~tandard of culpable exposure. The sixty-day period after
\vhich an employer would become responsible \Yas provided for only one reason- so that a.n employer would have
time to ma.ke an appropriate investigation to determine
whether a new employee was free enough from lung dis5
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ease so that he could safely be retained in employment.
Otherwise, no employer could afford to employ a miner
until it had been determined that the miner \vas not already silicotic. The sixty-day grace period made it possible for hard rock miners to avoid long hiatuses in their
employment while employers made sure it was safe to
employ them. It also gave employers a reasonable period after the effective date of the 0. D. I..~a"· "·ithiu
which to ''clean up" their mines.
If the reason for the ''thirty day period'' is understood, plaintiff's argument that the employee must sho"~
exposure on thirty separate days loses all its vitality.
An employee need only show his last harmful exposure
was during (not on each of) thirty days when he had the
status of employee of the employer against \vhom he asserts his claim. In the instant case, plaintiff was the
defendant employer's insurance carrier "during a period of thirty days'' within which defendant was harmfully exposed after 1931.

POINT II.
THAT INSURANCE CARRIER IS LIABLE TO
PAY BENEFITS FOR SILICOSIS WHICH
WAS '{ON THE RISK'' AT THE TilVIE OF
LAST EXPOSURE, AND THERE IS NO STATUTORY REQUIREMENT TI!~L\_T THE LIABLE
CARRIER HAVE BEEN ''ON THE RISK''
FOR THIRTY DAYS.
Plaintiff's final argument begins \vith the assumption
that this court "Till hold that the exposure ''during a
thirty day period" (as required by Section 33-~-14 in

6
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order to mnkP the last employ(\r liable) must be harmful
exposure or1 Paeh of 30 separate days. \\7 e "~in say no
more about ho"· ill-,varranted that assumption is. The
ingenious argum(l1lt is that Section 35-2-14 limits respon~ibility not only to the last employer in "·hose employrncnt thP employee "'as last exposed during 30 days but
also to the la.st insurance company "·ho insured th0 liahlP employer during a 30-day period w·hen the employee
wa~ exposed.
By urging such a construction of this section, \vhirh
reads, in its entirety, as follows:
''Where compensation is payable for an occupational disease the only employer liable shall be the
employer in whose employment the employee was
last injuriously exposed to the hazards of such
disease, provided that in the case of silicosis the
only employer liable shall be the employer in
"·hose employment the employee was last exposed
to harmful quantities of silicon dioxide ( Si02)
dust during a period of thirty days or more after
the effective date of this act."
Plaintiff asks this Court to engage in a monumental effort of judicial legislating. There is no word in the
section 'vhich carries any remote suggestion that the
legislature intended to change, for the purpose of compensation insurance, any basic concept of insurance la\v.
If the section were to be amended by the insertion of the
\vords plaintiff would have this Court read between the
lines, it would be doubled in length.
The plaintiff's argument that Section 35-2-14 should
be applied to determine \Yhich of successive carriers

7
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

should be responsible as if they \vere successiYe employers will not bear scrutiny. To apply the Section as the
plaintiff suggests would lead to a ridiculous result in any
number of entirely probable situations. Suppose, for instance, that an employer, then insured by a private carrier, employs a silicotic for the first time on No\·PmhPr
15. He \Yorks underground in dusty environmPnt for
thirty consecutive days. On December 1, ho\YeYer, thr
employer's policy expires and he insures \vith the Statt\
Insurance Fund. The silicotic becomes dis a bled on Dt\cember 16. Who, under the plaintiff's theory, must
respond? Plaintiff apparently belieYcs the emplo~Tc·r
should pay the benefits, even though the employer ·wa~
al\vays insured as the la\Y requires and even if the employer "rere insolvent and unable to pay sueh benefits.
The plaintiff cites the Deza case (Pacific En1ploycrs
Ins. Co. v. Commission, 108 Utah 123) as authorit~T for
the proposition \Ye no\v criticize. We submit that the
Deza case says plainly and without equivocation that the
carrier \\Tho must respond (\vhere there ha\ C been t\vo
or more carriers on the risk during the period of exposure) is the one \vho insures the employer "on tltc
date'' of last harmful exposure. On page 124, the Court
makes this statement:
''From the foregoing statement of facts, it is seen
that the last exposure to silicon dioxide dust \vas
June 7, 1943. The significant importance of this
da.te will become apparent immediatly. '' (Our
emphasis.)
7

Again, on page 128, the Court says this:
"As has been pointed out, hoV\Tever, June 7, 1943,
8
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of the applicant
to harmful quantitis of silicon dioxide dust, and
from that date until his employment ceased because
of total disability on March 25, 1944, he continued
in the employ of the ~1:ines Company but in the
eapacity of a watchman above ground on the property of the Company. The insurance carrier a.t the
time of such last exposure 'vas the State Insurance
Fund; this is the date which fixes the liability of
the employer, and consequently also attaches the
liability to the employer's insurance carrier a.s of
that date." (Our emphasis.)
1ras thf' daff' of the last ('.rposurr

What the Deza case really says is that the critical date
(in determining which carrier should respond) is the date
of last exposure and not the date of disability. The Court
specifically found that Deza. had never been harmfully exposed while Pacific Employers was on the risk. There was
no discussion at all about the need for thirty days' exposure \vhile a particular carrier is on the risk. The thirtyda.y c.riterion applies only to employers. It could not
logically apply to both employers and carriers.
Respectfully submitted,

FRANK J. ALLEN
Attorney for Defendant,
United Park City Mines Co.
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